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FIVE-SIXTH VERDICTS IN CIVIL
JURY TRIALS
H.

B EFORE

WILLIAM

IHRIG

the amendment of the Wisconsin constitution in
Article I, section 5 thereof, read:

1922,

The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend
to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy; but a
jury trial nay be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law.
By an amendment to the constitution, in November, 1922, there was
added to the above section the provision:
Provided, however, that the legislature may, from time to time, by
statute provide that a valid verdict, in civil cases, may be based on the
votes of a specified number of the jury, not less than five-sixths thereof.
The right of a trial by a jury of six men in a civil action in a
justice's court is provided for by section 302.04 of the Wisconsin
statutes.
After the amendment of the constitution, the legislature by Chapter
46 of the Laws of 1923 added the following sentences to section 302.18
providing for the return of the verdict of the jury in the justice court:
A verdict agreed to by five jurors shall be the verdict of the jury.
At the same session, the legislature, by Chapter 65 of the Laws of
1923 amended the present section 270.25 which previously read:
A general verdict is one by which the jury pronounce generally upon
all or any of the issues either in favor of the plaintiff or defendant. A
special verdict is that by which the jury finds the facts only, leaving
the judgment to the court. Where, upon the trial, the case presents
only questions of law the court may, in its discretion, direct the jury
to render a verdict subject to the opinion of the court.
by adding the following sentence:
A verdict, finding or answer agreed to by five-sixths of the jurors
shall be the verdict, finding or answer of the jury.
In analyzing tle origin of the preceding sentence, the Legislative
Reference Library, by Edwin E. Witte, Chief, advised:
We must report that our records do not indicate that the precise
language of the present section, 270.25, was taken from the laws of
any other state. Only the last sentence in this section relates to the
five-sixths jury verdicts; and this section was added by chapter 65,
laws of 1923. This chapter originally was bill No. 78-A, which passed
through three stages. This sentence in the original bill was almost
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identical in language with the constitutional amendment for the fivesixths jury trial adopted by the people in 1922 (being "a valid verdict
in civil cases may be based on the votes of five-sixths of twelve men
empaneled in the jury"). The assembly committee on the judiciary,
however, modified this sentence to read, "a verdict agreed to by ten
jurors shall be the verdict of the jury." The senate judiciary committee
later substituted for this sentence the present language: "A verdict,
finding or answer, agreed to by five-sixths of the jurors shall be the
verdict, finding or answer of the jury." This language came from the
senate judiciary committee, and we do not know from what source
it was taken. The senate judiciary committee at the time was composed of Honorable Howard Teasdale of Sparta, chairman; Honorable Max W. Heck, Racine; Honorable Theodore Benfey, Sheboygan; Honorable William F. Quick, Milwaukee, and Honorable A. E.
Gary, secretary of the Civil Service Commission; and of Senators
Burke and Mahon since deceased .....
.We- assume, however, that
this language was not taken from any other law, but represents merely
what the judiciary committee thought was needed to cover all situations
presented to juries in civil cases.
Thus we have the constitutional provision:
The legislature may . .

.

.by statute provide that a valid verdict in

civil cases, may be based on the votes of a specified number of the jury,
not less than five-sixths thereof.
with the statutory enactment:
A verdict, finding or answer agreed to by five-sixths of the jurors
shall be the verdict, finding, or answer of the jury.
There are present at the outset, two questions:
i. Did the legislature, in part, exceed the constitutional authorization?
2. What is the effect of the change accomplished by the Legislature,
if constitutional ?
The constitutionality of the statutory enactment has been discussed
three times. In the first case decided under the new law it was held
that':
Ten members -of the jury must agree before a question can be
answered; but the same ten must agree to each question before it can
be answered ..... Of course, a verdict may be arrived at if the same
ten or eleven jurors agree in their answers to all of the questions. 1
In the latest case on the point, Will v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St.
Paul Railway Comnpany,2 the rule laid down is as follows:
If now ten jurors, as in former days twelve jurors, are agreed upon
the essential questions asserted as to a cause of action or to sustain
a defense, though each such ten may not be the same as are in accord
'Dick v. Heisler, 184 Wis. 77, 86.
221o

N. W. 717 (decided Nov. 9, 1926).
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on other questions of the special verdict, their accord on such essential
questions is sufficient to make the verdict proper to be now received
under the present law.
This position caused the court to withdraw from the first stated
conclusion, although, in the earlier case, it was held that the view
taken therein was necessary in the light of the previously established
law, to hold the statute constitutional.
The reasoning in the first case, Dick v. Heisler,3 is as follows, at
page 84:
Prior to the enactment of sec. 2857, it was necessary for the entire
jury to agree upon a verdict, finding or answer ..... The last sentence
in the constitutional provision constitutes the amendment adopted in
1922, and we must therefore construe the statute with reference to such
constitutional provision. It will be noted that the constitutional provision does not refer in express terms to a special verdict, or to the
questions and answers of a special verdict, or to a finding or findings of the jury. The expression "a valid verdict in civil cases," etc.,
is used. The practice of submitting a special verdict has long been
in vogue in this state and in many of the other states of the Union.
"The right of a jury to find a special verdict is a common-law right
going back at least as far as 13 Edward I." 27 Ruling Case Law,
865; Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. i; and note in 24 L. R. A. N. S. L.
In this state the right to a special verdict is made absolute if requested
in time.

Gatzow v. Buening, lo6 Wis. I, 81 N. W. 1003.

In answering questions of a special verdict the jury is required to
find certain facts, and the questions of a special verdict are framed in
such a manner as to present the ultimate controverted facts which when
determined by the jury constitute its verdict, upon which, as a matter
of law, the court bases its order for judgment.
Where two or more questions of a special verdict are submitted to
a jury, the determination of one of such questions, or of a number
less than the whole number submitted, does not constitute the verdict of
the jury. The identical ultimate facts included in a special verdict are
also involved in a general verdict, and the ultimate result in either
event should be the same. By way of illustration, let us assume the
ordinary suit for damages on account of an automobile collision, where
the court submits a special verdict, which includes, first, the negligence
of the defendant; second, the proximate cause of the injury; and third,
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Under the instruction of
the court as given in the instant case, ten jurors could agree and answer
the first question in the affirmative, while two of the jurors voted in
the negative. In answer to the third question, the two jurors voting
in the negative on the first question could agree with eight of the jurors
voting with the majority on the first question in a negative answer,
and, if the second question were answered in the affirmative, such answers would constitute the verdict of the jury upon the subject of
liability, and the plaintiff would be entitled to recover.
3

184 Wis. 77.
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Let us now assume that, instead of submitting a special verdict as
above indicated, the court had submitted a general verdict. All of the
ultimate facts involved in the special verdict are also included in the
general verdict. The court in instructing the jury would necessarily
require a verdict of five-sixths or more of the jurors. 'In such a case,
if the jury resolved the ultimate facts involved in the general verdict,
in the same manner as was done by the jury under the special verdict,
the verdict would result in a disagreement. We have therefore concretely illustrated the error committed by the trial court in its instructions.
A situation may arise where a special verdict of twelve questions
involving ultimate facts is submitted. Eleven members of the jury
may agree upon each question, leaving each member of the jury disagreeing as to one question. Under the instructions given by the
court the answers of the jury would constitute its verdict and would
control the ultimate result. We must construe the statute as constitional if reasonably possible. The term "verdict" as used in the statute
implies not only a general verdict but a special verdict, and as so
applied to a special verdict it includes all of the questions and answers
of such special verdict; and we must hold thaf when the statute refers
to the finding or answer it refers to a situation where but one finding or
question is submitted.
It is only by giving the statute such construction that the saMne can
be held constitutional. [Italics are ours.]
As we construe the statute, ten members of the jury must agree
L4efore a question can be answered; but the same ten must agree to
each question before it can be answered. Where eleven agree to an
answer of the question, one voting with the majority may disagree on
another question, so as to permit the remaining eleven to answer such
question; however, in answering the remaining questions, the ten jurors
who voted with the majority in both questions must unite in their answers to all of the other questions. Of couise, a verdict may be arrived at if the same ten or eleven jurors agree in their answers to all
of the questions.
.... We realize that the construction herein placed upon the statute
greatly enhances the difficulties of courts and juries in the performance
of their duties in the trial of jury cases where, special verdicts are
submitted. The situation presented was evidently not in the minds of
the framers of this constitutional provision; but whatever may be our
view upon this subject, we must construe the statute in accordance with
the fundamental law as it exists.
The next case discussing the constitutionality of the Act is Hobbs v.
Nelson,4 wherein the intervening cases are cited, the court stating at
page 114:

This subject of the constitutional amendment changing the requirement of the unanimous verdict of the common-law jury in civil cases
of twelve men to one whereby a five-sixths vote of such jury may
determine the issues, was presented and fully considered and discussed
'I88 Wis. 1o8.
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in Dick v. Heisler, 184 Wis. 77, 84 et seq., 198 N. W. 734, and in
Stevens v. Montfort State Bank, 183 Wis. 621, 625, 198 N. W. 6oo.

What was said in those cases was repeated in Kosak v. Boyce, 185 Wis.
513, 523, 201 N. W. 757, and again in Bentson v. Brown, 186 Wis.
629, 637, 203 N. W. 380, and all are to the effect that it is necessary

for the same ten jurors to agree upon their answers to each and every
question of a special verdict.
Under the law prior to the constitutional amendment the failure of
all of the twelve jurors to agree as a unit on a general verdict, or on all
questions of a special verdict, resulted in an imperfect, defective verdict
or disagreement. The amendment and the statute have changed that
rule so that now, instead of a unit of twelve jurors, it is necessary
that there shall be a unit of only ten Jurors. But it must be the same
ten individual jurors in order to constitute the new unit required tinder
the amendment. To permit one set of ten to answer one essential question in a verdict, and another set of ten another, and so on, would
lnake a much more substantial encroachment upon the common-law
jury of twelve than can be held to be effected by the amendment and
the statute, as we have heretofore repeatedly stated. [Italics are ours.]
The late case of Wills v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway
Company,5 holds the effect that the statute to be such as would make it
unconstitutional under the decision of Dick v. Heisler (supra), although
in the Wills case the question of constitutionality is never expressly
mentioned and the new application is upheld. In the Wills case the
law on this very practically vital point is held to be as follows:
When in cases of this kind a special verdict is submitted to the jury,
it generally contains one or more sets of questions which may determine, independently of all the others, the essential elements of such a
case; that is, lawsuits generally present matter or issues which belong to what, for want of a better term, may be described as plaintiff's attack, failure in sufficient proof of which his lawsuit fails.
There may also be that which constitutes defendant's defense, immaterial, of course, unless plaintiff succeeds in his attack (disregarding
here the matter of counterclaims where the defendant, in effect, is plaintiff).
If now ten jurors, as in former days twelve jurors, are agreed upon
the essential questions asserted as to a cause of action or to sustain a
defense, though each such ten may not be the same as are in accord
on other questions of the special verdict, their accord on such essential questions is sufficient to make the verdict proper to be now
received under the present law. In other words, if ten jurors are
agreed that a defendant was negligent as to some particular duty,
and also that such negligence was a proximate cause of the injury and
as to the amount of plaintiff's damages, that is sufficient to make a good
verdict or finding against the defendant in that regard, although such
ten jurors may not be the same ten that are in accord on other questions.
If, however, one set of ten should agree that the defendant did fail in
the exercise of the degree of care required of him, but a different set of
r210 N. W.

717, 720.
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ten agree that such found negligence was a proximate cause of injury,
the combination of such two answers would not be a sufficient verdict
upon which the ultimate responsibility of the defendant could be based.
But when ten jurors are agreed, as it appears in this case, that the defendant did not have actual knowledge of a suggested danger, and also
are agreed that such defendant ought not, in the exercise of the care
required, to have known of such danger, and such two questions cover
the entire subject of the possible liability of defendant, the return of
such verdict requires a judgment for defendant, because it is a complete
verdict, in that. it finds a want of the essential element for the plaintiff
to maintain in such class of cases; namely, negligence or a breach of
duty.
The same situation undoubtedly would arise with reference to the
question of contributory negligence. One set of ten jurors might find
defendant negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause
of the injury; another set of ten might, however, find that there was
negligence by plaintiff proximately contributing to the same injury.
That defendant was thus found negligent and proximately contributing
to the injury would then become immaterial, so far as plaintiff's ultimate right to recover was concerned, because, ten jurors having found
that plaintiff himself was negligent, then it follows, as a matter of law,
that the plaintiff cannot recover.
Under this view, and regretting the former language of this court
above recited, which must now be deemed withdrawn, it becomes our
duty to hold that upon the verdict as here rendered the motion of the
defendant for judgment upon such verdict, should have been granted.
A further testing of the constitutionality of this construction is likely
in view of the previous construction of the law to make it apply equally
to both general verdicts and special verdicts, as stated in Dick V. Heisler, and the innovation here made and denied so many times previously,
in view of the development of the law before the constitutional and
statutory change.
The question of unanimity in arriving at the verdict which was
stressed in the Dick v. Heisler, and Hobbs v. Nelson cases, is firmly
established in the law.
In Amnerican Publishing Company v. Fisher, states the law as
follows :
Now unanimity was one of the peculiar and essential features of trial
by jury at common-law. No authorities are needed to sustain this
proposition. Whatever may be true as to legislation which changes
any mere details of a jury trial, it is clear that a statute which destroys
this substantial and essential feature thereof is one abridging the right.
It follows, therefore, that the court erred in receiving a verdict returned by only nine jurors, the others not concurring.
In order to guard against any misapprehension it may be proper to
say that the power of a state to change the rule in respect to unanimity
' 166 U. S. 464.
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of juries is not before us for consideration. Walker v. Souvinet,
U. S. 90; Heirtad v. California, iio U. S. 516.

92

In the leading case of City of Denver v. Hyatt7 a constitutional
provision allowed the legislature to provide for trial by a jury of less
than twelve. The statute enacted that three-fourths of the jurors sitting
could return a verdict for the jury. The question was of the necessity
for unanimity of the jurors sitting and the court held that in the absence of a constitutional change respecting unanimity in agreement,
a mere change by the constitution in the number constituting a jury,
did not affect any aspect of a jury trial but only the detail of number, and that the necessity for unanimity was continued in its full
force. 'The court held:
It is urged that the provision of the act permitting a verdict by a less
number than the whole is a wise one, and coincides with the views of
eminent jurists and others on this subject, and that in this advanced
age we should no longer cling to what is termed by some that relic of
barbarism and superstition which requires that a verdict must be unanimous. Whether the innovation is wise or not can in no manner aid in
the solution of the question presented. The sole inquiry is, does the
act conflict with the constitution of the state?
.... The legislature was granted authority to pass a law which might
provide for a jury in civil cases consisting of less than the commonlaw number. If it was intended to vest the legislature with supreme
control over the subject of juries in civil actions, why grant authority
to provide for the number only, instead of employing language which
would remove all restrictions whatsoever? To hold that such grant
of authority removes all restrictions would be a construction which
renders the language employed superfluous, in fact, would leave it without any effect whatever; whereas, if the intention was to preserve the
right in all respects, except as to number, every word employed is
given full force, meaning, and effect. So that, reading the section, and
applying to the language employed its usual significance, and bearing
in mind the doctrine of implication, the conclusion is irresistible that
a fair construction of the section is that thereby the right of trial by
jury in civil cases, as provided by the common law, is preserved in all
its essentials, except the one of number.
The legal aspects of a "trial by jury" are tersely stated in First
National Bank of Rock Springs v. Foster8 as follows:
.... It is also so well settled as to require no reference to authorities
that when the Constitution secures to litigants the right of trial by
jury the legislature has no power to deny or impair such right. The
courts have uniformly held, also, that the word "jury," as used in our
Constitutions, when not otherwise modified, means a common-law jury

'63

Pac. 403 (Colo.)

'61 Pac. 466, 63 Pac. 1056. 54 L. R. A. 549.
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composed of twelve men, whose verdict shall be unanimous. As stated
by the supreme court of Minnesota: "The expression 'trial by jury'
is as old as Magna Charta, and has obtained a definite historical meaning, which is well understood by all English-speaking peoples; and for
that reason no American Constitution has ever assumed to define it.
We are therefore relegated to the history of the common law to ascertain its meaning. The essential and substantive attributes or elements of jury trial are, and always have been, number, impartiality,
and unanimity. The jury must consist of twelve. They must be impartial and indifferent between the parties; and their verdict must be
unanimous. Lommen v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 65 Minn. 196, 33
L. R. A. -437, 68 N: W. 53. An extended list of the cases is given in
the note to State v. Bates, (Utah) 43 L. R. A. 48."
Also, see the note in L.R.A. 1917, A, page 91; 35 Corpus Jurs,juries,
sec. 124, and cases cited; Norual v. Rice, (Wis.).'

The cases under this new law discussing its effect upon the charges
to the jury as to burden of proof and affirmative and negative answers are:
Stevens v. Montfort State Bank,10 which was reversed in part in
Stokdyk v. Schmidt.'1 This latter case also overruled in part Papke
v. Haerle.1 2 In Stokdyk v. Schmidt the present rule was laid dovn
as follows:
. ***In Papke v. Haerle the rule was announced as to the right of
the defendant to have a question answered "No" where the burden of
proof was upon the plaintiff to establish an affirmative answer, namely,
when ten or more of the jurors were not satisfied by a preponderance
of the evidence and to a reasonable certainty that it should be answered
"Yes."
It is true the court said they should answer it "No" or disagree.
The words "or disagree," should not have been added, because if ten
or more were not convinced that it should be answered "Yes," then
such ten or more constituted a jury reaching the conclusion that plain'tiff had not established the fact that an affirmative answer should be
given to the question. A sufficient number of jurors to constitute a
jury -viere agreed that plaintiff had not established a case, and an answer
of "No" was the only permissible answer in such a case.
...
. Under our statute ten or more now constitute a jury qualified
to return a verdict, so the expression "ten or more," becomes equivalent
to "the jury." Courts since the origin of the jury system have instructed
that if the jury are not satisfied that the plaintiff has established the
material allegation of the complaint or the existence of the facts necessary to his recovery they must find for the defendant. The same holds
true as to questions in a special verdict. If the burden is upon one
2 Wis. 22.
10 183

Wis. 621.
n i9o Wis.
-,
2o8 N. W. 241.
2189 Wis. 156, 207 N. W. 261.
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party to establish an affirmative answer, and ten or more jurors are not
convinced that the burden has been met, then they must return a
negative answer, because ten or more, i. e., the jury, agree that the
question should not be answered in the affirmative.
.*..

If they stand ten to two, eleven to one, or are unanimous, they

can return a valid verdict. We are not now concerned with the rule that
the same ten must agree as to all material answers. If we were there
would be many more combinations in which a nugatory verdict or a disagreement could occur.
Of course, the late case of Will v. Chicago, Mlfilwaukee and St. Paul
Railway Company,1 3 must also be kept in mind in this connection.
Lastly, as to the effect of a failure to indicate on the verdict which
jurors disagreed so as to come within the requirement of a verdict by
five-sixths, the law is forcefully stated in Kosak v. Boyce. 4
The appellant further complains that in view of the fact that three
questions of the special verdict are answered by less than a unanimous
vote of the jury, it cannot be ascertained from an inspection of such
answers whether the same ten jurors agreed on all of them. This
is urged as reversal. This matter was considered in Dick v. Heisler,
184 Wis. 77, 198 N. W. 734, and it was there held that it was necessary
for the same ten jurors to agree upon answers to every question of the
special verdict. It was there suggested that this might be made to
appear by requiring the dissenting members of the jury to be indicated
wherever the answers were not unanimous. We have before us a verdict where it is possible that five members of the jury disagreed with
some feature thereof, and we have no way of telling whether ten
agreed on the answer to every question. We take this occasion to say,
however, that appellant is in no position to urge this as reversible error.
ie had it within his power to make this uncertain verdict definite and
certain by polling the jury. We will not tolerate a practice which will
permit a party to remain silent upon the coming in of the jury's verdict and thereafter urge the uncertainty of that verdict as ground for
a new trial or a reversal, when he had it within his power then and
there, by demanding a poll of the jury, to establish whether the verdict
was lawful. He who fails to challenge the regularity of a verdict in
this respect when it is returned into court will be held to have waived
such irregularity and will not thereafter be permitted to take advantage
of it.
Every change of fundamentals in the law brings to mind the complexity of the simple. Undoubtedly many cases will arise for decision
by the supreme court on the questions here involved. Whether the
change in the number of jurors agreeing on a verdict will be the sole
change wrought by the new law, or whether the present law as expressed in the Will case will be followed is yet to be decided. The
complexities arising under the latter possibility augur many vexing
questions and decisions.
N. W. 717 (Wis.)
185 Wis. 513, 523.
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